Florida Law Review
Volume 56

Issue 3

Article 3

July 2004

Section 12 of the Clayton Act: When Can Worldwide Service of
Process Allow Suit in Any District?
Jordan G. Lee

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jordan G. Lee, Section 12 of the Clayton Act: When Can Worldwide Service of Process Allow Suit in Any
District?, 56 Fla. L. Rev. 673 (2004).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol56/iss3/3

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Lee: Section 12 of the Clayton Act: When Can Worldwide Service of Proc

NOTE
SECTION 12 OF THE CLAYTON ACT: WHEN CAN WORLDWIDE
SERVICE OF PROCESS ALLOW SUIT IN ANY DISTRICT?
Jordan G. Lee* **
I.

II.

III.

INTRODUCTION .....................................

674

TRADITIONAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND VENUE

REQUIREMENTS FOR ANTITRUST CLAIMS ................

676

A. Domestic and Foreign CorporateDefendants ..........
B. Interactionof Specific Venue Statutes with
TraditionalJurisdictionRequirements ...............

676

ENTER SECTION 12 OF THE CLAYTON ACT: FLUCTUATING
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ANTITRUST VENUE AND
SERVICE OF PROCESS STATUTE ........................

680

681

A. The InitialRulings: Goldlawr, Inc. and

Go-V ideo, Inc ...................................
B. LiberalExpansion: Daniel v. American Board of
Emergency Medicine .............................
C. Reversing the Trend: GTE New Media Services v.
BellSouth Corp ..................................
D. Recent Decisions Surroundingthe Debate ............
IV.

EXPECTATIONS FOR MODERN CORPORATIONS FACING
ANTITRUST LITIGATION AND WHY BROAD SECTION 12
POWERS ARE NECESSARY ............................

A. Application of Section 12 to Domestic Corporations ....

681
684
685
687

688
688

B. Additional Considerationswhen Applying Section 12
to Foreign Corporations ..........................
692
C. Why BroadSection 12 Powers are Neededfor Equitable
Enforcement ofAntitrust Laws .....................
694
V.

CONCLUSION ......................................

696

* This Note is dedicated to the memory of my father, George R. Lee, and to my mother,
Christina, for bestowing me with her strength and courage. I also want to thank Professor William
Page for his guidance in developing this topic.
** Editor's Note: This Note won the Gertrude Brick Prize for the best Note in Fall 2003.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2004

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 3

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

I. INTRODUCTION

Few would claim that the requirements for personal jurisdiction in
federal courts, along with those for venue, are simple to understand with
unambiguous definitions and clear concepts.' To make matters more
complex, certain areas of the law have specific venue and personal
jurisdiction requirements.2 Often, the statutory jurisdiction and venue
provisions will contain broad powers, like worldwide service of process.'
The interaction between these specific statutory provisions and the
traditional requirements is often confusing and leads one to question
whether the statutes supplement, override, or alter prior jurisdictional
requirements.
Antitrust is one area of law where Congress provided specific statutory
venue and jurisdiction provisions for corporate defendants.4 Section 12 of
the Clayton Act authorizes special venue and service of process provisions
for all antitrust plaintiffs against corporate defendants.' Specifically,
section 12 states:
Any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws
against a corporation may be brought not only in the judicial
district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any district
wherein it may be found or transacts business; and all process
in such cases may be served in the district of which it is an
inhabitant, or wherever it may be found.6
The first clause of section 12 establishes the venue requirements for
corporate antitrust defendants; the second clause allows worldwide service
of process.7 Given that a federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction
1. See Robert C. Casad, PersonalJurisdictionin FederalQuestion Cases, 70 TEX. L. REV.
1589, 1589-92 (1992); Mitchell G. Page, Comment, After the JudicialImprovements Act of 1990:
Does the General Federal Venue Statute Survive as a Protectionfor Defendants?, 74 U. CoLO. L.
REV. 1153, 1153-60 (2003).
2. See, e.g., Clayton Act § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (2000); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78aa (2000); Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, Id. § 2805(a); Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1965 (2000); Patent and Copyright Venue
Provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2000); Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29
U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2) (2000).
3. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1965 ("All other process in any action or proceeding under this
chapter... may be served on any person in any judicial district in which such person resides, is
found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs." (emphasis added)); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2) (2000)
("[P]rocess may be served in any other district where a defendant resides or may be found."
(emphasis added)).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 22.
5. Id.
6. Id. (emphasis added).
7. Id.
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over a defendant when service of process is authorized by a federal
statute, 8 section 12 appears to authorize personal jurisdiction for antitrust
defendants in virtually any district court of the United States.9
Not all courts share this broad interpretation of section 12. While
constitutional boundaries to jurisdiction remain, 0 the federal circuits are
divided on whether the section 12 venue clause is a further restriction to
invoking worldwide service of process in corporate antitrust suits. Some
circuits hold the venue provision is a prerequisite to worldwide service of
process because of the words "in such cases."" Other courts find the venue
language to be supplementary to existing general provisions
and no
2
process.'
of
service
worldwide
to
restriction
additional
What difference could these competing interpretations have on antitrust
defendants? The answer: a big difference. Under the narrow interpretation,
defendants can be sued only using the more restrictive venue requirements
found in section 12.3 Under the broad interpretation, courts may exercise
jurisdiction and venue over a defendant if they meet the more liberal
constitutional due process requirements, creating few limitations on
bringing an antitrust suit. 4 Courts following the broad interpretation
justify their opinions through congressional history and antitrust public
policy. Courts that narrowly interpret the venue statute rely heavily on
prior dicta and the plain meaning of the language. Foreign defendants face
even fewer restrictions because the power of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) typically
overrides all other venue statutes and allows suit anywhere in the United

8. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(D).
9. See GTE New Media Servs. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1350-51 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(finding that suit can be brought in any district where the corporation is found or does business);
Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 988 F. Supp. 127, 143 (W.D.N.Y. 1997); Gen. Elec. Co.
v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 550 F. Supp. 1037, 1038 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
10. National minimum contacts often remains as the last limitation for defendants. Sec.
Investor Prot. Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1315-16 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd on othergrounds
sub nom. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992) ("[So long as a defendant has
minimum contacts with the United States, Section 27 of the [Securities Exchange] Act [of 19341
confers personal jurisdiction over the defendant in any federal district court."); see also Go-Video,
Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 1406, 1414 (9th Cir. 1989); In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 94 F.
Supp. 2d 26, 34-36 (D.D.C. 2000); Bucyrus-Erie Co., 550 F. Supp. at 1042-44.
11. See, e.g., GTE New Media Servs., 199 F.3d at 1350-5 1; Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 288
F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1961); Mgmt. Insights, Inc. v. CIC Enters., 194 F. Supp. 2d 520, 530-31
(N.D. Tex. 2001); Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 94 F. Supp. 2d at 29-32.
12. See Go-Video, Inc., 885 F.2d at 1410-11; Daniel,988 F. Supp. at 143-44. Some courts
also find the "in such cases" language to reference satisfaction of any venue statute, whether
antitrust or general. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 550 F. Supp. at 1038-39.
13. See, e.g., GTE New Media Servs., 199 F.3d at 1351; Mgmt. Insights, Inc., 194 F. Supp.
2d at 532.
14. See, e.g., Go-Video, Inc., 885 F.2d at 1416-17; In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust
Litig., No. 1426, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15099, at *30-31 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 2002).
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States, subject to the typically lenient national minimum contacts
restrictions.
This Note attempts to decipher the conflicting court decisions
surrounding the topic of antitrust service of process and to offer guidance
as to where suits could be brought for corporate defendants facing antitrust
violations. In addition, this Note argues for the broad interpretation of
section 12 of the Clayton Act for a more efficient and equitable application
of the antitrust laws. Part II of this Note summarizes the existing venue
and personal jurisdiction requirements, and describes how the federal
courts treat statutes altering these requirements. Part III recounts the
debate among the federal circuits on whether section 12 should be
interpreted broadly, or whether it should remain restricted. Part IV
explains the effects of the two interpretations on domestic corporate
defendants, and provides rationales offered by the courts for both the broad
and narrow interpretations. The same issues are then analyzed with
additional considerations for foreign corporate defendants. Finally, this
Note argues for the broadest possible interpretation of section 12 for both
domestic and foreign corporate defendants. Notwithstanding future
legislative clarification, federal courts must adopt a uniform, preferably
broad, interpretation of section 12 for antitrust claims to be equitably
enforced among all corporate defendants.
II. TRADITIONAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND VENUE
REQUIREMENTS FOR ANTITRUST CLAIMS

A. Domestic and ForeignCorporateDefendants
Establishing proper personal jurisdiction and venue is a complex
process, regardless of the type of civil action. 5 A short and oversimplified
review of the process, using antitrust suits as the example, is helpful for
later analysis. Beginning with personal jurisdiction for domestic
corporations, federal courts generally must first satisfy long-arm statutes

15. See supra note 1. For this discussion only, subject matter jurisdiction is not a concern.
For antitrust cases, specifically ones brought under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000),
federal statutes control and therefore satisfy the federal question subject matter jurisdiction statute.
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000); see McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 242
(1980) (finding the federal question, subject matterjurisdiction requirement under the Sherman Act
satisfied if the defendant's actions affect commerce). However, the question of whether the alleged
antitrust violation is within the scope of the statute always remains an important consideration. See
McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 242-43 (1980) (finding subject
matter jurisdiction established if the defendant's overall business activity has a substantial effect
on interstate commerce). For the sake of simplicity, this Note assumes subject matter jurisdiction
properly falls within one of the federal antitrust statutes.
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to exercise judicial power over a defendant. 6 Normally, a plaintiff would
need to satisfy the long-arm statute of the state where it resides before a
defendant may be sued in a federal district court.' 7 Next, the federal court
must engage in a due process minimum contacts analysis to ensure that the
court's exercise of power over the defendant does not violate the
Constitution. 8 Finally, proper notice must be given to the defendant,
which usually requires some form of service of process. 9 Once all the

16. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k). The majority of federal cases use Rule 4(k)(1)(A) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which makes federal district court powers as extensive as the long-arm
statute of the state where the court resides.
17. State long-arm statutes vary in their content and powers. Some allow the state to exercise
judicial reach as far as the Constitution will allow. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10
(Deering 2003) ("A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with
the Constitution of this state or of the United States."). Others limit the reach of state courts
(including federal courts in the state) to more restrictive judicial reach. See, e.g., FLA. STAT.
§ 48.193 (2003); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (Consol. 2003).
18. Through years of litigation, the due process limitation has evolved into the complex
minimum contacts test currently used. See generally Ronald A. Brand, Due Process,Jurisdiction
andaHagueJudgments Convention, 60U. PrT. L. REV. 661,669-90 (1999) (summarizing, through
a case-by-case analysis, the development and current state of the due process requirements for
personal jurisdiction). The first part of the test involves examining the nature of the activities
involved. Consideration should be given to the frequency of the activity (casual or isolated), the
nature of the activity (related or unrelated to the district), and causation between the activity and
the subject of the litigation (purposeful availment by the defendant). Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 318-19 (1945); see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
297 (1980) (finding that relying on foreseeablility alone does not create personal jurisdiction;
defendants must purposely avail themselves of privileges of the forum state, and reasonably
anticipate defending a suit there).
Courts also augment this complex balancing test by considering issues surrounding "fair play
and substantial justice." Int 7 Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 320; see also Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior
Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987) (stating that additional factors to consider include the burden on
the defendant, the interests of the forum state, plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief, efficient
resolution ofjudicial issues, and furthering fundamental, substantive social policies); Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477-80 (1985) (finding that fair play and justice factors
established reasonableness and lowered the required showing of other minimum contact factors).
If the state long-arm statute is one that allows state courts to reach the due process limits of the
constitution, then the only analysis needed is the minimum contacts test. See § 410.10; Abbott
Power Corp. v. Overhead Elec. Co., 131 Cal. Rptr. 508, 511 (Ct. App. 1976). The state long-arm
statute will necessarily be satisfied by the constitutional due process analysis. See Univ. Fin.
Consultants, Inc. v. Barouche, 196 Cal. Rptr. 484,486 (Ct. App. 1983). Additionally, consent by
the defendant to a court's jurisdiction satisfies personal jurisdiction requirements. See Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 592-94 (1991) (upholding fairly bargained forum
selection clauses as consent for jurisdiction).
19. Normally, service of process requirements come from statutes. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P.
4(c)-(l); FLA. R. CIrv. P. 1.070, 1.080. In addition to statutory requirements, the method of notice
must also conform to a constitutional due process test (like that for personal jurisdiction). The
method of notice must either be reasonably certain to provide notice or must not be substantially
less likely to give notice than any other feasible and customary method. See Mullane v. Cent.
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above tests are met, the federal district court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.20
In special cases, 2 like antitrust litigation, if a federal statute authorizes
the expansion of personal jurisdiction or service of process, then a federal
court may hear the case, regardless of state long-arm statutes.22 In these
situations, the question of national minimum contacts remains the only
constitutional barrier to personal jurisdiction.23 If there were no statute
authorizing service of process and personal jurisdiction for antitrust
corporate defendants, then state long-arm statutes would still be a
requirement.

Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,314-15 (1950). Finally, notice and personal jurisdiction
are often closely aligned. Usually, service of process within a state's borders also confers personal
jurisdiction. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) ("[J]urisdiction based on
physical presence alone constitutes due process.").
20. See Brand, supra note 18, at 664, 669-72, 675 (summarizing modem due process
requirements for establishing personal jurisdiction).
21. See supra note 2.
22. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(D) ("Service of a summons or filing a waiver of service is
effective to establish jurisdiction over the person of a defendant ...when authorized by a statute
of the United States."). Some statutes authorize worldwide service of process. See Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, § 18 U.S.C. § 1865(a) (2000) ("Any civil action or
proceeding under this chapter ...against any person may be instituted in the district court of the
United States in which such person... is found."); Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29
U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2) (2000) ("Where an action under this title is brought in a district court of the
United States, it may be brought in the district.., where a defendant resides or may be found.").
When Congress enacts statutes of this type, it gives federal courts power to hear these special cases
without consideration for state long-arm statutes. See FTC v. Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251,256
(5th Cir. 1981); Rolls-Royce Motors, Inc. v. Charles Schmitt & Co., 657 F. Supp. 1040, 1055
(S.D.N.Y. 1987).
23. See, e.g., Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 1406, 1413 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding
that section 12 of the Clayton Act authorized personal jurisdiction subject only to national
minimum contacts); Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1315 (9th Cir. 1985),
rev 'don othergroundssub nom. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992) (holding
the worldwide service of process provision in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 authorized
national minimum contacts analysis); Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d at 256 (requiring only due
process minimum contacts with the United States under the RICO statute authorized worldwide
service of process); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1340 (2d Cir.
1972) (stating that the use of the word "wherever" instead of "where" showed Congress intended
to authorize worldwide service of process and national minimum contacts); Michelson v. Merrill
Lynch, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 1279, 1285 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Rolls-Royce Motors, Inc., 657 F. Supp. at
1055; Casad, supra note 1, at 1594-97; Michael G. McKinnon, Comment, FederalJudicialand
Legislative JurisdictionOver Entities Abroad: The Long-Arm of US. Antitrust Law and Viable
Solutions Beyondthe TimberlanelRestatementComity Approach, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 1219, 1234-35
(1994). But see Doll v. James Martin Assocs., 600 F. Supp. 510, 518 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (requiring
minimum contacts within the forum state before worldwide service of process could authorize
personal jurisdiction); Bolton v. Gramlich, 540 F. Supp. 822, 843-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (same).
However, the Supreme Court has refused to explicitly rule on the national minimum contacts issue.
See Go-Video, Inc., 885 F.2d at 1414 n.8.
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Venue is another requirement for bringing a claim against a civil
defendant.24 The federal venue statute25 describes the general requirements
for all district courts. For corporate defendants facing antitrust litigation,
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)-(c) allows a case to be heard in any district where the
defendant resides,26 or possibly wherever the defendant may be found."
While the jurisdiction and venue requirements for foreign corporations
facing antitrust violations in the United States are analyzed in the same
basic manner, there are several important differences. First, venue for
foreign defendants, including corporations, is defined acutely in the Alien
Venue Act.28 Simply stated, "[a]n alien may be sued in any district."29
Thus, traditionally, venue was not an issue when a plaintiff sued a foreign
corporation.
Second, service of process for foreign defendants follows a different,
more expansive, set of rules.3" International politics and treaties often
affect the rules governing service of process. 3' Even without an
international treaty governing the situation, foreign corporations may still
be served in their own countries if the United States service of process
guidelines are satisfied.32 Finally, if a foreign defendant does not meet the
test of minimum contacts for any single state, then for federal question
cases like those arising under antitrust law, minimum contacts may be
analyzed with reference to the United States as a whole.33 Thus, once a
federal court finds that a foreign corporation has minimum contacts with
24. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2000); Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Consol. Stone Co., 278 U.S.
177, 179 (1929) (requiring defendants to assert or waive venue as a prerequisite to a civil suit).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2000).
26. Subsection 1391(c) defines where a corporate defendant resides. "[A] defendant that is
a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal
jurisdiction." Id. § 1391(c).
27. Id. § 1391(b).
28. Id. § 1391(d)(2000).
29. Id.
30. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f), (h), (j).
31. See id. 4(f) ("Service . . . may be effected . . . by any internationally agreed
means ...such as those means authorized by the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of
Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents."). See generally Brand, supra note 18; William S. Dodge,
Antitrust and the Draft Hague Judgments Convention, 32 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 363 (2001);
Jenia Iontcheva, Sovereignty on our Terms, 110 YALE L.J. 885 (2001).
32. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(2)-(3); Dee-K Enters. v. Heveafil Sdn. Bhd., 982 F. Supp. 1138,
1144-45 (E.D. Va. 1997) (finding service of process for a foreign defendant proper under Rule
4(t)(2)(C)(ii) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
33. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d
1326, 1340-42 (2d Cir. 1972); In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., No. 1426, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15099, at *30 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 2002); Paper Sys. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 967 F. Supp.
364, 369 (E.D. Wis. 1997) ("The relevant contacts are those with the United States, not the state
in which the district court sits." (citing Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330,333 (7th Cir. 1979)));
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 550 F. Supp. 1037, 1043-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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the United States as a whole, and that it has received proper notice
according to the appropriate international rules, the court may excercise
personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
B. Interactionof Specific Venue Statutes with
TraditionalJurisdictionRequirements
Specific jurisdiction and venue statutes may augment the above
requirements for jurisdiction in federal courts. Several areas of law have
specific venue and jurisdiction sections, broadening or limiting the reach
of federal courts when enforcing these statutes.34 Section 12 of the Clayton
Act is one of these statutes, providing venue and worldwide service of
process powers for antitrust actions against corporations.35 However,
courts disagree on the effect of section 12 on the general requirements. 36
In an effort to understand the ambiguous language and intent of that
section, several courts compare the language of section 12 with the
language of other statutes with similar objectives."
There are two significant Supreme Court rulings on the interaction of
specific and general venue provisions. First, in Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez,3"
the Court ruled that the specific venue provision found in the Jones Act9
did not override the general definitions of corporate residence and venue
found in 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)-(c).4" The Supreme Court reasoned that the
liberal changes to § 1391(c) were meant to broaden the choice of forum,
in accordance with the intent of the older Jones Act venue provision.4
Congress's intent in first enacting the Jones Act and later altering
§ 1391(c) was to liberalize venue; therefore the broadest interpretation
should be allowed for the Jones Act and § 1391(c) venue requirements.42

34. See supra notes 2-3.
35. See 15 U.S.C. § 22 (2000).
36. See In re Magnetic Audiotape Antitrust Litig., No. 02-7687, 2003 WL 21419584, at *2
(2d Cir. June 20, 2003); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., No. 1408(ILG), 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8444, at * 12 (E.D.N.Y. May 13, 2003).
37. See Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 1406, 1411-12 (9th Cir. 1989) (comparing
section 12 with cases interpreting the RICO jurisdiction and venue statutes); PaperSys., 967 F.
Supp. at 368 (comparing section 12 with the Jones Act venue provisions, and calling the RICO
statute a distant cousin of antitrust laws with persuasive authority concerning section 12); BucyrusErie Co., 550 F. Supp. at 1042 (comparing section 12 with cases interpreting the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934).
38. Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez, 384 U.S. 202 (1966).
39. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (2000). The Jones Act provides recovery for injury or death of a seaman
during employment. Id
40. Pure Oil Co., 384 U.S. at 204-05.
41. Id at205.
42. Id. at 207. The Court also pointed out that the similar patent infringement venue
provisions were specifically meant to limit venue choices, and therefore should be distinguished
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Second, the Supreme Court addressed the Alien Venue Act and its
effect on other venue provisions in Brunette Machine Works, Ltd. v.
Kockum Industries.43 The Supreme Court clearly stated that § 1391(d) is
not a general venue provision that may be overridden by specific venue
statutes, but is instead applicable to alien defendants in all cases." Basing
its holding on prior history and precedent surrounding the litigation of
aliens,45 the court declared § 1391(d) a broad and overriding provision,
defeating even the patent infringement venue requirements.46
Thus, the Supreme Court laid down the broad guidelines for specific
and general venue requirement interaction, including how to handle
§ 1391(d). Subsequently, other courts interpreted specific venue
requirements in accordance with the Supreme Court's broad principle of
overlapping powers.47 However, one court recently concluded that a
specific venue statute operated exclusive of the general venue
requirements. 4 Nonetheless, it appears that the manner in which a specific
venue statute will be interpreted depends significantly on congressional
intent.
III. ENTER SECTION 12 OF THE CLAYTON ACT: FLUCTUATING
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ANTITRUST VENUE AND

SERVICE OF PROCESS STATUTE

A. The Initial Rulings: Goldlawr, Inc. and Go-Video, Inc.
The treatment of the venue and worldwide service of process
provisions of section 12 varies among the circuits, with some holding that

from the normal, liberal interpretation of specific and general venue clauses. Id. at 206-07.
43. 406 U.S. 706, 714 (1972).
44. Id. at 713-14.
45. The general venue provisions were framed in reference to the defendant's place of
residence; a foreign defendant had no residence or citizenship, and therefore resides in no district.
Id. at 709. To hold otherwise "would in effect oust the federal courts of a jurisdiction clearly
conferred on them by Congress." Id at 710.
46. See id. at 713.
47. See, e.g., Briesch v. Auto. Club, 40 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1320-22 (D. Utah 1999) (finding
the ERISA venue statute upheld personal jurisdiction via national service of process); Michelson
v. Merrill Lynch, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 1279, 1286 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding lack of venue through
the RICO statute or § 1391(b)); Rolls-Royce Motors, Inc. v. Charles Schmitt & Co., 657 F. Supp.
1040, 1058 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding the RICO statute supplements § 1391).
48. Shell v. Shell Oil Co., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1108 (C.D. Cal. 200 1) ("mhe PMPA venue
provision ought to be exclusive of the general statute, as it appears closer in language and effect
to those 'special venue statutes' which have been found to be exclusive (e.g., patent infringement
cases and Title VII claims)."). However, a prior Supreme Court decision interpreted the Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2000), to be non-exclusive, while containing similar specific
venue language. Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co., 529 U.S. 193, 198-200 (2000).
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section 12 broadly supplements the general venue and service of process
requirements,49 but others holding that it narrowly supplants the general
statutes.5" The first case to mention the effect of section 12 on general
venue requirements was Goldlawr,Inc. v. Heiman.5 The issue before the
court was whether the federal venue transfer statute 52 required personal
jurisdiction to be established before the transfer of venue or whether
personal jurisdiction could be obtained in the new venue.53 The plaintiff
invoked § 1406(a) to transfer venue because the lower court held that
service of process under section 12 did not satisfy the preceding venue
provision, and therefore personal jurisdiction was improper in the initial
venue.54 Neither party in the case challenged the lower court's ruling that
personal jurisdiction was improper.55 Nevertheless, the court, in ruling that
jurisdiction was a prerequisite to venue transfer in § 1406(a), analyzed the
implementation of section 12 as a basis for personal jurisdiction.56 Here,
the court relied on the plain language of the statute, and found the
worldwide service of process clause in section 12 to be dependent on
satisfaction of the preceding venue requirements." In a brief, twoparagraph analysis, the court concluded, "[T]he extraterritorial service
privilege is given only when the other requirements are satisfied," and the
two clauses in section 12 were integrated. 5' However, because the issue
before the court was the operation of § 1406(a), and not section 12, the
weight of the court's analysis appears to be limited to persuasive dicta.59
The operation of section 12 was directly confronted in Go- Video, Inc.
v. Akai Electric Co. 60 The Ninth Circuit proceeded through an extensive
analysis of section 12's history, the policy considerations behind section
12, and prior case law, and held that the service of process clause of

49. Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 1406, 1412-13 (9th Cir. 1989); In re Auto.
Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., No. 1426,2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15099, at *24-28 (E.D. Pa. July
31, 2002); Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 988 F. Supp. 127, 143-44 (W.D.N.Y. 1997);
Paper Sys. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 967 F. Supp. 364, 366-67 (E.D. Wis. 1997); Icon Indus. Controls
Corp. v. Cimetrix, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 375, 380 (W.D. La. 1996).
50. See, e.g., GTE New Media Servs. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1351 (D.C. Cir.
2000); Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 288 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1961); Mgmt. Insights, Inc. v. CIC
Enters., 194 F. Supp. 2d 520, 530-32 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
51. 288 F.2d at 581.
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (2000).
53. Goldlawr,Inc., 288 F.2d at 581.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 582.
56. Id. at 581.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 581-82.
60. 885 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1989).
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section 12 operated independently of the venue clause. 6' Here, because the
defendant was a foreign corporation, the plaintiff tried to establish venue
through § 1391 (d), and service of process through section 12.62 The court
began by reviewing the holdings of Pure Oil Co.63 and Brunette Machine
Works, Ltd.,' accepting the rule that specific venue provisions supplement
general rules rather than supersede them.65 Because of § 1391(d)'s
treatment as a broad and overriding venue provision in Brunette Machine
Works, Ltd., the court would only find the venue provision of section 12
a prerequisite to service of process if it discovered express congressional
intent or implicit intent through section 12's history.66 Turning its analysis
first to the history of section 12, the court examined the treatment of the
bill and inferred that Congress's intention was to allow
the service of
67
process and venue clauses to function independently.
Next, the court focused on case law and endorsed the district court
decision found in GeneralElectric Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co. 68 In BucyrusErie Co., the district court distinguished Goldlawr,Inc. because it did not
address the applicability of § 1391(d) after the subsequent rulings in Pure
Oil Co. and Brunette Machine Works, Ltd.69 In addition to finding
Bucyrus-Erie Co. persuasive, the Ninth Circuit abandoned Goldlawr,Inc.
because its analysis concerning section 12 was purely dicta.7" The court
then rejected the statutory plain-language argument through an in-depth

61. Id. at 1413-15.
62. Id. at 1407-09.
63. 384 U.S. 202 (1966).
64. 406 U.S. 706 (1972).
65. Go-Video, Inc., 885 F.2d at 1409; see also Brunette Machine Works, Ltd., 406 U.S. at
713-14; Pure Oil Co., 384 U.S. at 204-07.
66. Go-Video, Inc., 885 F.2d at 1409-10.
67. Id. at 1410. The court noted that the initial version of the section 12 bill contained only
a venue provision. Id. When service of process was later raised as a concern, members of Congress
decided to postpone process issues for later legislation. Id. Later, the Senate added the service of
process provision, with no debate or objection. Id. Combine this analysis with the implied
congressional intent found in other case law, and congressional intent weighs heavily in favor of
a broader interpretation. See Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 988 F. Supp. 127, 144
(W.D.N.Y. 1997) ("[Section 12] was enacted in 1914, decades before Congress expanded the
general venue provisions in 1988. Thus, at the time § [12] was enacted, the special venue
provisions ... served a definite purpose."); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 550 F. Supp. 1037,
1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("Not only was there no concurrent action taken on section 12 when section
1391(d) was enacted in 1948, but Congress has taken no action on section 12 since the enactment
of section 1391(d).").
68. Go-Video, Inc., 885 F.2d at 1411-12.
69. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 550 F. Supp. at 1039-41 (construing Goldlawr,Inc. as requiring any
venue statute to be satisfied, not necessarily the one found in section 12, before worldwide service
of process was allowed under section 12).
70. Go-Video, Inc., 885 F.2d at 1411.
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grammatical analysis that yielded no persuasive weight for either side.7
The last step in the court's discussion was to apply national minimum
contacts, and allow the foreign corporate defendant to be sued in any
jurisdiction within the United States.72 Thus, after a thorough analysis, the
Ninth Circuit held the service of process clause in section 12 to be
independent of the venue requirements."
B. Liberal Expansion: Daniel v. American Board of
Emergency Medicine
Almost a decade later, the district court in Daniel v. American Board
of Emergency Medicine 4 applied the broad section 12 interpretation to
domestic corporations.7 5 The earlier Go-Video, Inc. decision involved a
foreign corporation and the special treatment of § 1391(d), but the Daniel
court held the service of process clause of section 12 to be independent of
the venue provision when applied to a domestic defendant using
§ 1391(b)-(c). 7 6 Similar to the court in Go- Video, Inc., the Daniel court
also dismissed the Goldlawr, Inc. precedent as dicta. 7 Instead of
Goldlawr,Inc., the Danielcourt relied on two prior district court cases to
justify its application of Go- Video, Inc.'s broad section 12 interpretation. 8
The Paper Systems v. Mitsubishi Corp. 9 court argued that judicial
convenience and legislative history support the finding that section 12
clauses may be used independently. The Icon IndustrialControlsCorp. v.
Cimetrix, Inc.8" court used the Supreme Court's treatment of specific

71. Id. at 1412. The appellant argued that the words "such case" in section 12 referred to the
preceding venue text, while the appellee argued "such cases" pointed to the initial words of section
12 referring to antitrust cases as a general class. Id.The court eventually rejected grammatical
analysis and relied on its other arguments for support of an independent section 12. Id. at 1413.
72. Id. at 1414-17. The court relied on its prior decision in Securities Investor Protection
Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1315 (9th Cir. 1985), rev 'd on other grounds sub nom. Holmes
v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992). In Vigman, the Ninth Circuit held that

the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which contained language nearly identical to section 12, was
an appropriate situation for national minimum contacts to apply. Id. at 1315-16. National minimum
contacts was the only due process requirement under section 12. Id. at 13 16.
73. Go-Video, Inc., 885 F.2d at 1413.
74. 988 F. Supp. 127 (W.D.N.Y. 1997).
75. Id. at 143-44.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 144.
78. Id. at 143 (relying on PaperSystems v. Mitsubishi Corp., 967 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Wis.
1997), and Icon IndustrialControls Corp. v. Cimetrix,Inc., 921 F. Supp. 375 (W.D. La. 1996), for
supporting analysis); see also infra notes 79-80.
79. PaperSys., 967 F. Supp. at 369 (noting that when section 12 was enacted in 1914, the
venue provision was broader than the old § 1391 statute, and Congress did not alter section 12 when
it altered § 1391 to become broader in 1988).
80. Icon Indus. Controls Corp., 921 F. Supp. at 380.
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venue statutes in Brunette Machine Works, Ltd. to support the independent
application of section 12's service of process clause. Endorsing most of the
arguments from the two prior district court cases, the Daniel court then
added its own congressional intent analysis.8
The court next deferred to Congress, indicating that Congress could
always alter the effect of section 12 legislatively, and the court pointed out
the lack of subsequent modifications.82 Finally, other safeguards that
prevent abuse of forum selection, such as forum non conveniens and venue
transfer, solidified the Daniel court's objection to narrowing section 12.83
It then ruled that the worldwide service of process of section 12 could be
used with domestic defendants via § 1391(b)-(c).84 The court found the
worldwide service of process in section 12 to extend federal courts'
antitrust powers to their constitutional limits. This approach broadened
the reach of antitrust laws for domestic corporate defendants by using
worldwide service of process and the general venue requirements together
(not relying on the overriding power of § 1391(d)), to allow suit in
virtually any jurisdiction the defendant could be found.
C. Reversing the Trend: GTE New Media Services v. BellSouth Corp.
Despite the thorough analysis by the Go-Video, Inc. and Danielcourts,
several recent decisions reversed the trend towards a broad section 12
interpretation and re-established support for the narrow view.86 The
catalyst to changing the once-settled broad view of the worldwide service
of process clause of section 12 was the D.C. Circuit's opinion in GTE New
81.
82.
83.
84.
passage:

Daniel, 988 F. Supp. at 144; see also supra note 67.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 143-44. The court described the full effect of its ruling in the following short

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) provides, in pertinent part, that venue is proper in a federal
question case in "a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants
reside in the same State." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) provides that "a corporation shall
be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal
jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced." Because all the corporate
defendants in this case are subject to personal jurisdiction in New York, by virtue
oftheir amenability to worldwide service ofprocess under § [12], they all "reside"
in New York for venue purposes under § 139 1(b).
Id. Thus, the court held section 12 to provide personal jurisdiction, venue, and notice to the
defendants wherever they were found. Id.
85. Id. at 143.
86. See GTE New Media Servs. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 2000);
Mgmt. Insights, Inc. v. CIC Enters., 194 F. Supp. 2d 520, 531 (N.D. Tex. 2001); In re Vitamins
Antitrust Litig., 94 F. Supp. 2d 26, 30-31 (D.D.C. 2000).
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Media Services v. BellSouth Corp. 7 Here, GTE claimed that five regional
telephone companies conspired to control the Internet business directory
market in violation of the Sherman Act.88 After failing to achieve personal
jurisdiction through the District of Columbia's long-arm statute, GTE
looked to section 12's worldwide service of process to authorize personal
jurisdiction for its suit. 9 The D.C. Circuit explicitly rejected the Ninth
Circuit's opinion in Go-Video, Inc. and adopted a restrictive view of
section 12.90 The court relied on the plain language of the statute, finding
that the service of process clause after the semicolon in section 12 could
only be invoked by satisfying the preceding venue clause.9 It would be
irrational for Congress to add two clauses together, connected by the
language "in such cases," and not intend the first prong to be a prerequisite
for the second.9 2 The court discussed the holding in Go-Video, Inc., but
rejected the opinion with little explanation other than the redundancy of
the venue provision.93 Relying only on the plain meaning of the statute
itself, GTE New Media Services abandoned the Go-Video, Inc. analysis
and held the two clauses in section 12 to be interdependent.94
Two months after the circuit court decision in GTE New Media
Services, the D.C. District Court reconsidered its opinion in In re Vitamins
AntitrustLitigation.9" The Vitamins court reversed its previous holding that
supported the Go- Video, Inc. analysis, and held that the GTE New Media
Services precedent bound it to the narrow, restrictive interpretation of
section 12.96 However, the district court did sharply criticize the GTE New
Media Services Court's rejection of Go- Video, Inc.97 After expressing its
disappointment with the ruling, the Vitamins court proceeded through a
systematic rejection of all arguments for a broad reading of section 12,
relying on the GTE New Media Services precedent throughout.9" The court

87. 199 F.3d at 1351.
88. Id. at 1346.
89. Id.at 1347, 1350.
90. Id. at 1351.
91. Id. at 1350.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1351.
94. Id.
95. 94 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2000). This case was previously decided by the same court,
endorsing Go- Video Inc.'s broad interpretation. In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., No. 1285, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12405 (D.D.C. July 29, 1999). However, in light of the soon thereafter decided GTE
New Media Services case, rejecting Go- Video Inc.'s arguments, the court revisited the issue in the
present action. Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 94 F. Supp. 2d at 29.
96. Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 94 F. Supp. 2d at 29-30.
97. Id. at 28-31 ("This Court questions whether the holding of GTE comports with the goals
of the antitrust laws and the practice of consolidating pretrial proceedings for multidistrict
litigation.").
98. Id. at29-31.
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also provided the vague, but necessary, distinction between GTE New
Media Services and Brunette Machine Works, Ltd. that allowed the court
to ignore the special treatment of § 1391 (d).99 The district court expressed
satisfaction with the analysis found in Go- Video, Inc., but limited itself to
the precedent of GTE New Media Services and the narrow interpretation
of section 12." °
D. Recent DecisionsSurroundingthe Debate
After the GTE New Media Services decision, several courts addressed
the section 12 service of process issue, with differing results.'' Some
courts continued to follow the Go-Video, Inc. and Daniel analysis and
found the two provisions in section 12 to be independent. 1 2 A
Pennsylvania district court, in two back-to-back decisions, embraced GoVideo, Inc. for foreign corporate defendants and rejected GTE New Media
Services. 03 In its opinion, the court relied on the Supreme Court's decision
in Brunette Machine Works, Ltd. and found that the broad interpretation
of section 12 in Go- Video, Inc. was "in greater harmony with the purpose
of the antitrust laws.""'
In contrast, two courts recently sided with the GTE New Media
Services and Goldlawr, Inc. opinions."' In ManagementInsights, Inc. v.
CIC Enterprises,a Texas district court accepted the D.C. Circuit's view of

99. Id.at 30-31 ("GTE limits choice of venue when Section 12's service provision is used
as a basis for personal jurisdiction, whereas Brunette addresses the choice of venue where valid
service already has been made. Brunette is thus inapplicable here.").
100. Id. at31.
101. See, e.g., In re Magnetic Audiotape Antitrust Litig., No. 02-7697, 2003 WL 21419584,
at *2 (2d Cir. June 20, 2003) (noticing the disagreement between courts about section 12
interpretation, but unable to rule because not an issue on appeal); In re Isostatic Graphite Antitrust
Litig., No. 00-cv-1857, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21656, at *9-10 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2002)
(distinguishing the instant case and Go- Video Inc., from GTE New Media Services because GTE
New Media Services did not reference the Alien Venue Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d)); In re Auto.
Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., No. 1426,2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15099, at *24-30 (E.D. Pa. July
31, 2002) (same); Mgmt. Insights, Inc. v. CIC Enters., 194, F. Supp. 2d 520, 530-33 (N.D. Tex
2001) (following GTE New Media Services because of the danger of abuse presented by possible
§ 1391 (b)-(c) expansion).
102. See, e.g., Isostatic GraphiteAntitrust Litig., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21656, at *9-10;
Auto. RefinishingPaintAntitrustLitig., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15099, at *21-23; see also Magnetic
Audiotape AntitrustLitig.,2003 WL 21419584, at *2; In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8444, No. 1408 (ILG), at *12 & n.5 (E.D.N.Y. May 13, 2003).
103. Isostatic Graphite Antitrust Litig., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21656, at *9-10; Auto.
Refinishing PaintAntitrust Litig., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15099, at *21-23.
104. Auto. Refinishing PaintAntitrust Litig., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15099, at *23.
105. Mgmt. Insights, Inc. v. CIC Enters., 194 F. Supp. 2d 520, 531 (N.D. Tex. 2001); Yellow
Page Solutions, Inc. v. Bell AtI. Yellow Pages Co., No. 00-CIV-5663, 2001 WL 1468168, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2001).
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section 12 because it was "more reasonable in light of the plain meaning
of the statute."' 1 6 The court also found that the Go-Video, Inc. court's
interpretation of section 12 lacked consideration for the "circular and
monolithic" inquiry which must be done using § 1391 (b)-(c) for domestic
corporations." 7 At the same time, a New York district court also adopted
the narrow interpretation of section 12 in Yellow Page Solutions, Inc. v.
Bell Atlantic Yellow Pages Co.' Here, the court quickly adopted the
narrow interpretation from GTE New Media Services and Goldlawr,Inc.,
focusing instead on the transacting business requirement of the section 12
venue clause, and finding it required the same level of contacts as the New
York long-arm statute.° 9 Finally, other courts merely point out the split in
authority, but decline to address the issue." 0 It appears that federal circuits
are evenly divided on the issue of which side of the section 12 debate to
follow, creating confusion for potential litigants.
IV. EXPECTATIONS FOR MODERN CORPORATIONS FACING
ANTITRUST LITIGATION AND WHY BROAD

SECTION

12 POWERS ARE NECESSARY

A. Application of Section 12 to Domestic Corporations
The conflicting opinions among the various circuits make it difficult
for a corporate defendant to anticipate where they may defend antitrust
litigation. Domestic corporations must anticipate the broad interpretation
of section 12 in conjunction with 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)-(c). Following the
logic detailed in Daniel,"' one finds that tracing the general venue statutes
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure leads to a virtually unlimited
choice for personal jurisdiction. In federal question cases like those based
on antitrust violations, personal jurisdiction is valid if service of process
is authorized by a federal statute." 2 In this case, section 12 of the Clayton
Act authorizes worldwide service of process. 1"' Worldwide service of

106. Mgmt. Insights, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 2d at 531.
107. Id. at 532. Curiously absent from the court's analysis is any mention of the Brunette
Machine Works, Ltd. decision and the special treatment of§ 1391(d). Id. at 530-33.
108. Yellow Page Solutions, Inc., 2001 WL 1468168, at *3.
109. Id. at *3, *10.
110. See, e.g., In re Magnetic Audiotape Antitrust Litig., No. 02-7687, 2003 WL 21419584,
at *2 (2d Cir. June 20, 2003); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., No. 1408(ILG), at *12 &
n.5 (E.D.N.Y. May 13, 2003).
111. 988 F. Supp. 127, 143-44 (W.D.N.Y. 1997); supra note 84.
112. See FED. R. CIv. P. 4(k)(I)(D) ("Service... is effective to establish jurisdiction over the
person of a defendant... when authorized by a statute of the United States.").
113. 15 U.S.C. § 22 (2000).
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process allows personal jurisdiction to fall "wherever it may be found."" 4
Thus, the worldwide service of process clause of section 12 allows suit for
a domestic antitrust defendant in any district.
The other statutory limit to bringing a claim, proper venue, can be
satisfied through a combination of subsections (b) and (c) of § 1391.
Section 1391(c) places a domestic corporation's residence anywhere it is
subject to personal jurisdiction." 5 With worldwide service of process and
unlimited personal jurisdiction under section 12, § 1391(c) deems a
domestic corporation to reside in any district for venue purposes. Section
1391(b) allows venue in any district where a defendant resides, if all
defendants reside in the same state.' 16 Merging § 1391 (b) and (c), a court
would find that a domestic corporation resides in any district (because
personal jurisdiction is valid in any district), venue is proper in any district
where the defendant resides, and therefore venue for a domestic
corporation would be valid in any district where the corporation may be
found. However, the due process minimum contacts test remains the final
and only limitation to bringing suit in a jurisdiction."'
If this virtually limitless power seems unfair, consider several of the
justifications offered by the courts for this broad, sweeping power. Public
policy considerations support strong, broad antitrust enforcement. The
nature of antitrust laws themselves is to protect overall competition
throughout the country." 8 The large-scale economic impact of antitrust
activities and the goals of antitrust laws themselves make broad venue and
service powers useful in enforcing the laws." 9 To balance the broad
powers of antitrust enforcement, many courts rely on other safeguards like
venue transfer statutes and the doctrine of forum non conveniens.120 Also,

114. Id.
115. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2000) ("[A] defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to
reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction.").
116. Id. § 1391(b).
117. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 550 F. Supp. 1037, 1042-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
The only limitation on bringing suit is the constitutional minimum contacts test with the forum
state, but even then the defendant can be sued in any district in the state. Id.
118. See Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 988 F. Supp. 127, 144 (W.D.N.Y. 1997)
(finding that narrowing the scope of section 12 and making it more difficult to sue multiple
defendants in a single action goes against the policies of antitrust law); Paper Sys. v. Mitsubishi
Corp., 967 F. Supp. 364,368 (E.D. Wis. 1997) (pointing to antitrust law's purpose in regulating the
national, competitive economy); Renee Hardt, Kodak v. Fuji: A Test Case for the Extraterritorial
Application ofthe Sherman Act, 15 B.U. INT'L L.J. 309, 313-14 (1997).
119. See Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 1406, 1413 (9th Cir. 1989); Paper Sys.,
967 F. Supp. at 368 ("Perhaps more than any other law, the antitrust laws are national in scope and
impact. The antitrust laws define the rules of the free market economy; like the weather, the
economy respects no state or natural borders."); Icon Indus. Controls Corp. v. Cimetrix, Inc., 921
F. Supp. 375, 382 (W.D. La. 1996).
120. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); See Daniel, 988 F. Supp. at 144; Icon Indus. Controls Corp., 921
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congressional action implies support for the broad interpretation of section
12.2' Congress enacted section 12 of the Clayton Act in 1914, in part, to
give antitrust laws greater jurisdictional powers than were available
through the more restrictive general venue statute. 2 2 Years later, when
Congress altered the general venue statute 123 to give it broader effect, it did
not alter the language of section 12. 24 Several courts argue that this is the
reason why a narrow interpretation of the venue provision appears
redundant. 25
In contrast, jurisdictions following GTE New Media Services require
satisfaction of the venue provision in section 12 before the worldwide
service of process clause may be used. 26 For the worldwide service of
process under section 12 to be invoked, venue "may be brought not only
in the judicial district whereof [the corporation] is an inhabitant, but also
in any district wherein it may be found or transacts business."' 27 Prior case
law defined the phrase "transacts business" as the broadest of the venue
requirements listed in section 12.121 While the requirement for a company
to transact business is not overbearing, 29 it remains a limitation to using
the worldwide service of process powers, and it is more restrictive than the
requirement under the broad section 12 interpretation.13 A plaintiff may

F. Supp. at 383.
121. See Daniel, 988 F. Supp. at 144; Page, supra note 1,at 1162-67 (detailing the evolution
of the general venue provisions and major changes throughout history); see also supra note 67 and
accompanying text.
122. Icon Indus. Controls Corp., 921 F. Supp. at 382-83.
123. 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
124. Icon Indus. Controls Corp., 921 F. Supp. at 382-83.
125. See, e.g., Go-Video Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 1406, 1410-11 (9th Cir. 1989);
Daniel, 988 F. Supp. at 144 ("Congress... is certainly free to restrict antitrust venue through new
legislation ifdesired."); Icon Indus. ControlsCorp., 921 F. Supp. at 382-83. This directly counters
the superfluous prong argument of GTE New Media Services v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343
(D.C. Cir. 2000), and other decisions.
126. GTENewMediaServs., 199 F.3d at 1351; Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 288 F.2d 579, 581
(2d Cir. 1961); Mgmt. Insights, Inc. v. CIC Enters., 194 F. Supp. 2d 520,531-32 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
127. 15 U.S.C. § 22 (2000).
128. See United States v. Scophony Corp., 333 U.S. 795,808-09 (1948); Icon Indus. Controls
Corp., 921 F. Supp. at 379 n.4; Casad, supra note 1, at 1611-12; Annotation, Construction and
Effect of Venue Provisionsof§ 12 of Clayton Act (§ 15 U.S.C.A. 22), 3 A.L.R. FED. 120 (2002).
129. Scophony Corp., 333 U.S. at 807-08 (transacting business test equaled the "practical,
everyday business or commercial concept of doing or carrying on business 'of any substantial
character').
130. See Reynolds Metal Co. v. Columbia Gas Sys., 694 F. Supp. 1248, 1250-51 (E.D. Va.
1988). In describing the effect of its decision, the Scophony Corp. court wrote: "The [Supreme]
Court merely states that in the absence of a full briefing on due process concerns, it deems it
inappropriate to equate the 'transacts business' venue standard of section 12 with the minimum
contacts due process standard despite any apparent similarities between the two standards." Id. at
1251.
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not use worldwide service of process if the venue clause in section 12 is
not satisfied, but it can still bring suit using the general venue, service of
process, and personal jurisdiction guidelines. 3' Thus, under the narrow
section 12 interpretation, a plaintiff may bring an antitrust suit only in a
district where the domestic corporate defendant transacts business or has
other, greater contacts within the district.
The justification offered by GTE New Media Services and other courts
for their restrictive interpretation centers on the structure of section 12.
Most courts rely on the plain meaning of the language contained in section
12 to justify a narrow interpretation. 32 They focus on the fact that the
venue provision would be redundant, were it independent of the service of
process provisions. 33 Other than grammatical arguments, courts adopting
the narrow interpretation regularly cite the Goldlawr, Inc. decision as
precedent' 34 or ignore the policies set forth in Pure Oil, Co. and Brunette
Machine Works, Ltd.135 In fact, most courts that find the section 12 venue
requirement to be a prerequisite to the worldwide service of process do so
quickly, offering fewjustifications and assuming that the reasoning is selfevident by the plain language of the statute. 36 The plain language
arguments initially sound appealing, but few courts directly counter any
of the analysis of courts interpreting section 12 broadly. Instead, courts
adopting a narrow interpretation disagree with courts adopting a broad
interpretation, and ignore the motivation for their holdings. 37 Given the
direction from the Supreme Court in Pure Oil, Co. and Brunette Machine
Works, Ltd., the national effects of antitrust laws, legislative action,
judicial convenience, and the failure of other courts to properly resolve

131. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. 1391(b) (2000); FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1), (h).
132. See GTE New Media Servs. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
("To read the statute otherwise would be to ignore its plain meaning."); Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman,
288 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1961); Mgmt. Insights, Inc. v. CIC Enters., 194 F. Supp. 2d 520, 530
(N.D. Tex. 2001).
133. GTENew Media Servs., 199 F.3d at 1351; Mgmt. Insights, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 2d at 53132.
134. See GTE New Media Servs., 199 F.3d at 1351; Mgmt. Insights,Inc., 194 F. Supp. 2d at
531; Yellow Page Solutions, Inc. v. Bell Ati. Yellow Pages Co., No. 00-CIV-5663, 2001 WL
1468168, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2001).
135. But see In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 94 F. Supp. 2d 26, 30 (D.D.C. 2000)
(distinguishing Brunette Machine Works, Ltd. from GTE New Media Services because the former
involved venue when service of process was already established, while the latter involved the
choice of venue when service of process was being argued through section 12).
136. See, e.g., GTE New Media Servs., 199 F.3d at 1351; Yellow Page Solutions, Inc., 2001
WL 1468168, at *3.
137. But see Mgmt. Insights, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 2d at 532 (agreeing with GTE New Media
Services and its precedent, but adding its own disapproving analysis of a broadly interpreted section
12 possibly interacting with § 1391(c)).
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these issues seem to weigh in favor of the broad domestic application of
section 12.
B. Additional Considerationswhen Applying Section 12
to ForeignCorporations
Foreign corporations, while facing similar issues, and using much of
the same analysis as above, face other complications that domestic
corporations do not. Several of the cases surrounding the section 12 debate
involve foreign defendants.' 38 Brunette Machine Works, Ltd. addressed the
special power of § 1391(d). 39 The Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d),
unless Congress specifically intends otherwise, overrides other venue
provisions. 4 Go-Video, Inc. applied the Brunette Machine Works, Ltd.
rationale to section 12, holding that § 1391(d) can be used in conjunction
with the worldwide service of process power of section 12.4 If one
applies § 1391(d), venue is valid in any jurisdiction.' Under the broad
view of section 12, the worldwide service of process clause may be used
without satisfying the venue provision of section 12. This approach allows
valid service of process in any jurisdiction, and therefore personal
jurisdiction in any district.'43 Thus, antitrust suits may be brought in any
district against foreign corporations. If worldwide service of process in
section 12 does not have the venue prerequisite (as under the broad
interpretation), the only limitation to suing a foreign corporation for
United States antitrust violations is the national minimum contacts test.'44
GTE New Media Services did not address the application of § 1391 (d)
to a foreign corporation.' But, as explained in Vitamins, the GTE New

138. See, e.g., Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1989); In re Isostatic
Graphite Antitrust Litig., No. 00-cv-1857, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21656, at *9-10 (E.D. Pa. Sept.
19,2002); In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., No. 1426, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15099,
*2 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 2002); Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 94 F. Supp. 2d at 26; Paper Sys. v. Mitsubishi
Corp., 967 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Wis. 1997); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 550 F. Supp. 1037
(S.D.N.Y. 1982).
139. See Brunette Mach. Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus., 406 U.S. 706, 713-14 (1972).
140. Id.
141. Go-Video, Inc., 885 F.2d at 1409-10.
142. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (2000).
143. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(D).
144. Id. 4(k)(2); see also Go-Video, Inc., 885 F.2d at 1414 (finding that federal statutes
permitting the service of process beyond the boundaries of the forum state broaden the authorized
scope of personal jurisdiction); Paper Sys. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 967 F. Supp. 364, 369 (E.D. Wis.
1997) ("When Congress provides for nationwide (or world-wide) service of process, it invokes the
power of the United States. The relevant contacts are those with the United States, not the state in
which the district court sits." (citing Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 333 & n.3 (7th Cir.
1979))); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 550 F. Supp. 1037, 1043-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
145. GTE New Media Servs. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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Media Services court's express rejection of Go-Video, Inc. implies that
GTE New Media Services still requires the section 12 venue clause as a
prerequisite, despite the invocation of § 1391(d).' 46 A plaintiff must still
prove the defendant corporation, at a minimum, transacts business in the
district before venue and worldwide service of process are appropriate. To
avoid conflict with Brunette Machine Works, Ltd. the Vitamins court
interpreted Brunette Machine Works, Ltd. narrowly to correspond with
GTE New Media Services.'47 In the final hurdle to jurisdiction, the
Vitamins court also explained how the national minimum contacts test
operated under GTE New Media Services, finding that it continued to
require the state long-arm analysis first. 4 '
Thus, if Go-Video, Inc. and the broad interpretation of section 12
persevere, a foreign corporate defendant may be required to defend
antitrust violations in any United States district court. However, if the two
clauses of section 12 are interpreted as codependent, as under GTE New
Media Services, the corporation must transact business in the district for
venue, service of process will be worldwide, and personal jurisdiction will
be national. With the exceptions of GTE New Media Services and the
questionable analysis in Goldlawr,Inc., the majority of cases dealing with
§ 1391(d) do recognize the special treatment of alien defendants, and
support a broad interpretation of section 12.'
However, the international community is not as receptive to
unrestricted United States power. The Hague Convention, signed by the
United States and other nations, was designed to deal with these situations,
limiting service of process and jurisdictional powers of signing countries
and reaching compromises between foreign governments.5 0 But, with the
broad powers under section 12, United States federal courts often choose
to circumvent the requirements of the Hague Convention by exercising
their jurisdiction over foreign defendants under section 12. ' When

146. In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 94 F. Supp. 2d 26, 30 (D.D.C. 2000).
147. Id. at 30-31.
148. Id. at 31-32 ("[National minimum contacts] is simply a last-resort provision for
establishing jurisdiction over alien defendants who would otherwise not be subject to the
jurisdiction of any court."); see also FED. R. CIv. P. 4(k)(2). A state long-arm examination is still
required under GTE New MediaServices, but if that test fails, national minimum contacts may still
be satisfied. Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 94 F. Supp. 2d at 31-35.
149. See, e.g., Go-Video, Inc., 885 F.2d at 1412-13; In re Isostatic Graphite Antitrust Litig.,
No. 00-cv-1857, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21656, at *9-10 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2002); In re Auto.
Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., No. 1426,2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15099, at *21-23 (E.D. Pa. July
31, 2002); PaperSys., 967 F. Supp. at 367; Bucyrus-Erie Co., 550 F. Supp. at 1040.
150. See Brand, supranote 18, at 662; Dodge, supranote 31, at 363-65; lontcheva, supranote
3 1, at 885-87.
151. See, e.g., Dee-K Enters. v. Heveafil Sdn. Bhd., 982 F. Supp. 1138, 1144-48 (E.D. Va.
1997) (using section 12 service of process and national minimum contacts to extend jurisdiction
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dealing with foreign corporate defendants, United States federal courts
need to balance the interests of international politics and United States
economic interests in efficient antitrust law enforcement before exercising
their powerful section 12 jurisdiction.
C. Why BroadSection 12 Powers are Neededfor Equitable
Enforcement ofAntitrust Laws
Upon first glance, the idea of a broad interpretation of section 12
allowing defendants to be sued in almost unlimited federal jurisdictions
seems, understandably, unfair and open to abuse. Indeed, the laws of civil
procedure embody the belief that parties should not be forced to defend
themselves in foreign, biased, and inconvenient locations. 52 Courts have
always frowned on forum shopping for advantages against defendants.'
However, Congress routinely passes statutes that expand the jurisdiction
of federal courts beyond the normal limits, and courts routinely apply them
as written.'54 Given the strong national interest in efficient and effective
antitrust laws, there is no reason that section 12 should not enjoy the same
broad interpretation as other statutes.
If one focuses on the justification for antitrust laws generally, the broad
interpretation of section 12 poses no significant danger to a defendant's
substantive rights. Consider the rare example of a corporation whose
business keeps most of its activities in one area of the country, but whose
illegal pricing scheme or monopoly affects prices across the country in
other downstream markets. For the broad interpretation of section 12 to
overstep the function of antitrust enforcement (protection of competition),
the corporation would need to be small enough that defending itself across
the country would be substantially inconvenient and unfair. Yet, the
corporation simultaneously needs to be large enough to affect the
downstream markets across the country in order to cause the antitrust
violation in the first place. This factual scenario is not likely to occur
because a corporation's antitrust violations generally have greater impact

over a foreign defendant); Dodge, supra note 31, at 364-65 ("[The United States has a much

greater ability than other countries to project its antitrust law extraterritorially."); Iontcheva, supra
note 31, at 885.

152. See Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987) (factoring in the
distance traversed and the foreign government's ability to adjudicate the parties' rights into the
reasonableness analysis of due process minimum contacts).
153. See Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109-10 (1945) (establishing the outcomedeterminative test for federal diversity jurisdiction to discourage plaintiffs from shopping around
the state and federal courts for the most favorable legal outcome); King v. Johnson Wax Assocs.,
565 F. Supp. 711, 714-15 (D. Md. 1983) ("[S]ection 12 was not intended to provide a forumshopping plaintiff with an unfettered choice of venue.").
154. See supranotes 2-3.
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on the nation's competitive economy than the narrow region where they
satisfy the general venue requirements. Also, in the unlikely situation
where a corporation did have the above characteristics, courts provide
additional safeguards. If the district that the defendant must travel to is
substantially inconvenient, or has no factual connection to the case at
hand, courts often support the use of venue transfer, forum non
conveniens, or dismissal to remedy the situation.'
If the above scenario does not quell supporters of narrow section 12
interpretation, they should consider the argument of congressional intent
furthered by several courts. 6 As discussed earlier, Congress enacted
section 12 in 1914 to allow antitrust plaintiffs an easier time bringing suits
against corporations.' The original general venue statute was more
restrictive than section 12.58 Congress later changed the general venue
provision to the broader current version of § 1391."9 Many courts exhibit
anxiety over the seemingly superfluous venue provision in section 12
because Congress did not change section 12 to reflect the broadening of
§ 1391. However, corroboration for the broad interpretation remains in that
Congress did not change section 12 after altering § 1391, because it knew
the broader § 1391 implicitly expanded section 12 to this extensive reach.
Additionally, specific venue statutes that courts interpreted to have
language and intent similar to section 12 have worked together with
§ 1391 for broad jurisdictional powers. 6 Looking thoroughly for
congressional intent provides a reasonable explanation for the apparent
superfluous purpose of the venue provision in section 12.
Fear for an alien defendant's jurisdictional rights and international
politics might also lead supporters of the narrow interpretation to fear
serious abuse of antitrust powers under a broadly interpreted section 12.
Much of the above analysis that justified the broad interpretation of section
12 for domestic corporations applies to foreign corporations as well.
However, alien corporations involved in antitrust violations in the United
States face substantial inconvenience coming to the United States and
defending a suit anywhere. As the Supreme Court explained in Brunette
Machine Works, Ltd., alien corporations face substantial burdens

155. See, e.g., Daniel v. Am. Bd.ofEmergencyMed., 988F. Supp. 127, 144(W.D.N.Y. 1997)
("In the meantime, there are other safeguards... including the doctrine of forum non conveniens
and the right to seek a change of venue.").
156. See Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 1406, 1410 (9th Cir. 1989); Daniel, 988
F. Supp. at 144; Icon Indus. Controls Corp. v. Cimetrix, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 375, 381 (W.D. La.
1996).
157. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
158. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. S. Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 372-73 (1927); Paper
Sys. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 967 F. Supp. 364, 369 (E.D. Wis. 1997); Daniel, 988 F. Supp. at 144.
159. See Daniel,988 F. Supp. at 144.
160. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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defending lawsuits in any jurisdiction in the United States, and are
traditionally not afforded the same level of protection as citizens.' 6'
Section 1391(d) codifies Congress' concurrence. 162 While other countries
may not appreciate the lack of sympathy United States courts have for
foreign corporations, international firms affect a substantial portion of the
United States economy, and thus must be accountable to the full power of
United States antitrust statutes. Those firms with little contact with the
United States will remain protected by the national minimum contacts test.
Also, the safety nets of venue transfer, forum non conveniens, and
dismissal curtail other abuses of section 12.163 In light of their special
treatment under § 1391(d)--even without interpreting section 12
narrowly-foreign corporations are already treated as having no additional
burden to litigating in any United States district court. Interpreting section
12 broadly does nothing to change that.
V. CONCLUSION

While initially appealing because of its simplicity, the narrow
interpretation of section 12 constricts the power of antitrust enforcement
and overlooks significant factors for broadening its reach. Antitrust laws
need flexible jurisdictional and venue provisions to properly implement
their goals. The Goldlawr, Inc. case remains unpersuasive because of
dicta, and GTE New Media Services' brief analysis leaves many of the
arguments addressed in Go-Video, Inc. and Daniel unanswered. In
contrast, Go-Video, Inc. and others endorsing the broad section 12
interpretation use case law, congressional history, and public policy to
look beneath the language of the statute and find strong arguments for a
powerful section 12. Additionally, foreign corporate defendants face
increased exposure to antitrust liability because of the unique nature of
§ 1391(d) and the Supreme Court rulings in Pure Oil Co. and Brunette
Machine Works, Ltd.
With the broad interpretation of section 12 comes the fear of
exploitation. Defendants could find themselves defending cases in distant
parts of the country where they have few, if any, connections. When these
situations do occur, courts suggest reliance on other efficiency safeguards,
like venue transfer, forum non conveniens, and dismissal. Proper
enforcement of national concerns, such as competition and antitrust laws,
require liberal jurisdictional powers to prevent violators from manipulating
the traditional safeguards of civil procedure for their own protection.

161. Brunette Mach. Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus., 406 U.S. 706, 713 (1972).
162. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (2000).
163. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257-58 (1981) (upholding
international defendant's motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens).
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